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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHESTER E. FARROW,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

No. 15458

HEALTH SERVICES CORP.,
SALT LAKE CLINIC, LOUIS J.
SCHRICKER, M.D., and LOUIS
G. MOENCH, M.D. I
Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS SALT LAKE CLINIC
AND LOUIS G, MOENCH

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action for malpractice brought by Appellant
Chester E. Farrow against the Health Services Corporation, the
Salt Lake Clinic, Louis J. Schricker, M.D., and Louis G. Moench,
M.D.
Plaintiff-Appellant alleges that the defendants were negligent in their care and treatment of him during his 1974 confinement in the L.D.S. Hospital.
DISPOSITION

I~~

LOWER COURT

Shortly before trial the court granted summary judgment in
favor of Dr. Schricker and the Health Services Corporation.
A jury trial was held as to the remaining defendants,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Moench and the Salt Lake Clinic.

The jury found in favor of

Moench and the Salt Lake Clinic by returning a verdict of no
cause of action.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents Salt Lake Clinic and Louis G. Moench seek affirmance of the jury verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents Salt Lake Clinic (hereinafter referred to as
Clinic) and Dr. Louis G. Moench (hereinafter referred to as Dr.
Moench) disagree with the Statement of Facts in Appellant's
Brief because it omits evidence detrimental to Plaintiff.

Res-

pondents submit the following Statement of Facts as a more

ace~

rate account of the evidence adduced at trial.

It should also

be noted that Respondents Clinic and Dr. Moench are not

invo~~

in the questions or evidence presented at the motions for summar
judgment and therefore any pre-trial testimony which was not
used during the trial itself will not be relied upon in this
Statement.
Background Prior to Hospitalization
The plaintiff Chester E. Farrow testified that at the time.
of trial he was 52 years of age and had worked as a geological

consultant.

(Tr., p. 1344).

He obtained a bachelor's degree

from Oklahoma State University in 1949 and thereafter worked fM
the United States Geological Survey.

He worked for the Atomic
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Energy Commission, as a consultant for various private companies, as an in-house geologist for one such company, and was an
independent consultant at the time of the incident.

(Tr., p.

1345).

Plaintiff related that in August of 1974, while helping
his wife move groceries from his Chevrolet Blazer, he hit his
arm against the mirror bracket.

This impact immediately caused

a series of spasms and great pain to his arm and neck region.
(Tr., p. 1349).

Shortly thereafter he went to the Moab Hospi-

tal and consulted with a Dr. Peters.
tion to ease the pain.

He was given some medica-

(Tr., p. 1350).

The following Monday he contacted his family doctor who
gave him more medication.

The next day he went to the Moab

Hospital and had x-rays taken.

(Tr., p. 1351).

At that time

it was suggested that he go to Salt Lake City for further treatment.

(Tr., p. 1352).
Upon cross-examination the plaintiff admitted that he had

experienced marital difficulties over a long period of time and
in fact his wife had divorced him in 1966 but subsequently remarried him.

(Tr., p. 1422).

His wife felt there were more

serious problems with the marriage than did the plaintiff.

(Tr.,

p. 1426).

Hospitalization and Surgery
Plaintiff stated that he arrived in Salt Lake City on AuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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gust 11 and checked into the L.D.S. Hospital the following
day.

(Tr., p. 1352).

He stated that he was examined by Dr.

Schricker who took his medical history and told him there was
a good chance he would have to undergo an operation.

He had

previously been told of this possibility by his Moab doctor.
(Tr., p. 1352).
Dr. Schricker testified that he performed a physical examination and neurological examination of the plaintiff at the
time of his admission and recommended x-rays of the neck and a
myelogram.

(Tr., p. 1887).

These tests subsequently revealed

that the plaintiff had a ruptured cervical disk at the C-6
level.

He discussed the findings with Plaintiff and his wife

and it was mutually agreed that Plaintiff undergo corrective
surgery.

(Tr., p. 1887).

Prior to surgery Plaintiff stated that he informed both
Dr. Schricker and the anesthesiologist that he had had a bad
reaction to sodium pentothal in a 1949 appendectomy operation
and that he became very violent under the drug's influence.
(Tr., pp. 1354-1355).
On August 15 Dr. Schricker performed a cervical laminectomy
and a foramentomy.

These operations removed part of the bone of

the spinal column and the root of a small tunnel called the fo~·
men in order to allow the nerve more room and to do away with
compression.

(Tr., p. 1888).

Dr. Schricker testified thataf-
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ter this type of operation the area is unprotected and there
is considerable danger of injury to the spinal column unless
activity and stress are avoided.

(Tr . , p. 1B9 3) •

August 16 Through August 22
Dr. Schricker recalled that on the 16th of August the
plaintiff told him that he was free of pain in his arm and
neck area except for the expected discomfort from the incision
(Tr., p. 1893).

itself.

During this period Dr. Schricker

testified that the plaintiff suffered mild confusion from the
medication which he had received--especially the morphine.

The

confusion fluctuated a great deal so that sometimes he appeared
quite clear and other times he appeared quite confused.

(Tr.,

p. 1894).
Karen Pool testified that she was a registered nurse who
was assigned as the "charge" nurse for the sixth floor, west
(Tr., p. 1668).

ward.

She was on duty approximately nine of

the 10 days that the plaintiff was in the ward,

(Tr., p. 1684)

although she worked at different hours on different days.

(Tr.,

p. 1686).
She stated that for several days after the operation he
progressed very well but continually tried to get up and walk
around.

(T r.' p. 1672) .

The nurses were concerned he would

harm himself because of the vulnerability due to the nature of
the surgery.

on August 17 at 6:30 p.m. a Posey belt was put on
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the plaintiff to restrain him in bed.

(Tr., p. 1685).

The

belt is like a vest with straps on it designed to keep a patient in bed and is also used as a reminder that he should nc,t
get up.

Shortly after the belt had been placed on the plaintiff

Miss Pool found him wandering in the halls and found him to be
angry and frustrated at having been restrained.

(Tr., p. 1674),

On August 19 or 20 Dr. Schricker had a conversation with Mr.
Farrow concerning personal problems.

Plaintiff related

that~

was concerned about his wife with whom he had had marital and
domestic difficulties over a long period of time.

He told the

doctor he had a young daughter who "he thought the world of" and
who he was very concerned about.

He also stated that his busi·

ness had not been going well and that he had other financial
worries.

(Tr., p. 1895).

Dr. Sehr icker stated that by August 2 0 the patient had improved, was quite oriented, and was wondering what had happened
during the last few days.
Between the time of the operation and probably August 20
the plaintiff testified that he suffered from visual hallucinations.

He had great fear of what was going on and thought the

world was corning to an end.

(Tr., p. 1357).

During this per-

iod he experienced sexual fantasies and was extremely frighten~.
(Tr., p. 1358).

The plaintiff stated that he first saw visual

hallucinations and later suffered from audio hallucinations.
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He described these sensations, both audio and visual, to Dr.
Schricker during his confinement.

(Tr., p. 1359).

Dr. Schricker,

however, recalled Plaintiff's complaint about visual hallucinations but did not recall any conversation regarding audio hallucinations.

(Tr., pp. 1919-1920).

On August 20 because of his previous discussion with Plaintiff, Dr. Schricker requested Mr. Kent Griffiths, a psychological social worker of the hospita~ to visit the plaintiff in order
to help him with his difficulties.

(Tr., pp. 1895-1896, 1922).

About this time Plaintiff recalls waking up in the hospital bed
and looking at his chart and finding a span of time for which
he could not account.

(Tr., pp. 1356-1357).

On this day the social worker made a notation in the progress notes as follows:
Had long discussion with patient. Reveals
extensive history of personal and marital
difficulties. He expressed the dynamics
involved in his wife's problems and his own.
His confusion seems to revolve around the
lack of any consistent meaning to the sign if ican t relationship in his life. He loves
his family dearly but is unable to express
those feelings to them and is often suppressed by his wife when he tries to talk
to her.
This can be seen as an extension
of her own insecurity and needs. So both
are struggling to have their needs met and
neither is listening to the other. Will follow up daily.
Signed Kent Griffiths, M.S.W.
(Ex. D-1, p. 87).
Plaintiff testified that during this period of time he became afraid of all hospital personuel except for Kent Griffiths.
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He said that he would be feeling good and in complete control
of his emotions and suddenly would go into hallucinations and
become frightened.

(Tr., p. 1360).

The audio delusions which he heard would be the voices of
four people who were always making derogatory comments about
him.

He stated that Dr. Schricker's voice was involved in the

hallucination, the voice of an older man, the voice of an older
woman, and the voice of a man with a southern accent.
were not talking directly to him but about him.

They

He thought at

times he was in a room where psychiatric patients were observed.
(Tr., p. 1363).
He recalled telling Mr. Griffiths about these
around the 18th or 19th of August.

hallucinatio~s·

(Tr., p. 1366).

The plain-

tiff testified that he spent most of his time with Mr.
talking about his marital problems.

Griffit~

(Tr., p. 1469).

On August 21 the hospital notes revealed the following:
Dr. Schricker!
Can we consider a psych consult on this pt? Kent Griffiths.
Immediately following this notation is the word, "Yes!" in the
handwriting of Dr. Schricker.

(Ex.

D-1, p. 87).

On the following day another no ta ti on was made by Mr. Gr if· ·
fiths:
Discussed problems with wife and pt.
There
definitely are and have been for years problems in this marriage that need psychiatric
if not other forms of counseling.
There
seems to have been very little give and take
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and this has affected not only the marriage
but the children as well. Feelings of jelousy, inadequacy, resentment, fear, withdrawal have been expressed. Will continue.
Signed Kent Griffiths, M.S.W. (Ex. D-1, p.
88).
The plaintiff stated that Mr. Griffiths did not talk to
both him and his wife at the same time.

(Tr., p. 1425).

He

disagreed with part of this statement and said specifically that
while they had marital problems over a fairly lengthy period of
time there were also long periods of time when they had no problems.

He asked Mr. Griffiths if he would continue marriage

counseling after he had been discharged from the hospital.

He

did this to please his wife more than for his own personal needs.
(Tr., p. 1426).
August 23--The Day
Dr. Schricker stated that on August 23 he had a conversation with the plaintiff concerning the need for psychiatric help.
The primary purpose for obtaining the psychiatrist was to help
Mr. Farrow with his marital and family problems.

The doctor

stated that at that time he believed the plaintiff was suffering
from anxiety but not from depression.

The plaintiff never hinted

nor intimated in any way that he might want to take his own life.
(Tr., p. 1896).
Plaintiff testified that on the morning of the 23rd he
talked with Dr. Schricker and asked that the best psychiatrist
available in salt Lake City contact him.

He stated he wanted

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

someone that could straighten out the hallucinations and his
great anxiety.

(Tr., p. 1369).

At this time he was also con-

cerned that the hospital had lost $3, 000 or $4, 000 which he had
on his person when he arrived.

(Tr., p. 1369).

The plaintiff

stated that Dr. Schricker said he would obtain a psychiatrist
for him but never said that one was actually corning.

(Tr., p.

1372).
On the morning of the 23rd Dr. Schricker testified
called Dr. Moench and asked him for a consul tat ion.

that~

Dr. Moench

asked if the evening would be all right and Dr. Sehr icker replied
it would.

(Tr., p. 1897).

He told Dr. Moench that the patient

was having marital difficulties.

He then told the plaintiff

that Dr. Moench would see him that evening.

(Tr., pp. 1897-1898),

Dr. Moench testified that he asked Dr. Schricker if it was an
emergency and Dr. Schricker replied it was not.

(Tr., p. 1299).

The plaintiff stated that later on in the day Mr. Griffiths
visited him in his room and asked him if he would like to go
into the garden area for a while.

The plaintiff remembers walkin:

down at least two flights of stairs and then taking the elevator
the rest of the way.

(Tr., p. 144 3).

Farrow recalled that they

spent about an hour in the patio area which was his most pleasant day at the hospital.

(Tr., p. 1444).

During the meeting

they discussed his anticipated Tuesday discharge--this buoyed hi 5
spirits.

He then returned with Mr. Griffiths to his room by ~~
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ing the elevator up six floors.

(Tr., p. 1445-1446).

When Farrow arrived back in his room it was still daylight.
During the rest of the evening Farrow stated he would pace up
and down in the room, sit in a chair for a while, get up, lie
down, etc.

He had been doing this for several nights.

(Tr., p.

144 7).
He admitted on cross examination that during these times
he realized he was on the sixth floor and frequently looked out
over the city.

(Tr., p. 1447).

He stated that he knew when he

was having a hallucination but that they were overwhelming and
that he did not have great control over his actions.

(Tr., p.

1448) .
Lerona Callahan testified that she was a licensed practical
nurse and had been working at the L.D.S. Hospital for 12 years.
(Tr., p. 714).

She started work on August 23 at 3:00 p.m ..

On

that day she attended the plaintiff at 4:00 and took his temperature and vital signs.
was fine.

She asked him how he was and he said he

He looked fine and had no complaints.

(Tr., p. 1716).

Around 5:00 she gave the plaintiff his food tray and at
5:30 she collected it.

He again had no complaints at that time.

She recalls looking in on him around 6:00 when she walked down
the hall.

She did not routinely chart every visit unless some-

thing significant occurred.

(Tr., pp. 1717-1718).

August 23--The Night
Around 7:00 on the evening of the 23rd the defendant Dr.
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Louis Moench arrived at the hospital and reviewed Plaintiff's
chart.

He then conferred with the charge nurse and

discuss~

Plaintiff's previous behavior including the prior restraint
using the Posey belt.

(Tr., pp. 13 04-1324) .

Dr. Moench testified that he entered the room of Plaintiff,
introduced himself, and began to discuss Plaintiff's background.

He reviewed with him his medical history concerning

the operation and also extensively discussed his private life.
The plaintiff talked about his marital situation, his financial
situation, and his confinement in the hospital.

He related an

incident where he pulled a gun on his wife because she was five
minutes late coming home and told how his wife ultimately got
the gun from him and stuck it in his ribs.

(Tr., pp. 1241-1242;

1879-1880).
Defendant stated that during the conference Farrow told
him that he was hearing voices from the ceiling and the doctor
then showed him that some of the voices were coming from a pillow speaker used for television and inter-hospital paging.

The

plaintiff seemed relieved after learning about this speaker.
(Tr., p. 1242).
The plaintiff, according to Dr. Moench, expressed fear
about being transferred to the psychiatric ward and the doctor
reassured him that he did not think this would be necessary.
(Tr., p. 1292).

During these conversations the plaintiff never
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stated that he was in terror or fear nor did the doctor gain
an impression of this fact from talking with him.

The doctor

stated that the plaintiff's demeanor during the interview was
initially very restless but that he calmed down towards the end.
He seemed perfectly cooperative and by the end of the conversation the doctor thought he had a fairly good rapport with
the plaintiff.

Farrow seemed perfectly willing to continue the

conversation as long as the doctor thought it was necessary.
(Tr., p. 1306).
The testimony of Plaintiff concerning this visit was
generally in accordance with that of Dr. Moench.

The plaintiff

stated that he openly discussed his problems with Dr. Moench
and willingly answered any of the doctor's questions.

The plain-

tiff stated to the doctor that he needed and wanted psychiatric
help.

(Tr., p. 1377-1378).
The plaintiff stated that when the doctor showed him the

pillow speaker he told the doctor that he already had discovered
this device and had asked the nurses to stop playing music on it.
(Tr., p. 1378).

Farrow stated that the defendant reassured him

that everything would be all right.

(Tr. , p. 13 7 9) .

Plaintiff recalled that Dr. Moench frightened him very much,
and that after he left the plaintiff felt anxiety-ridden and
fearful that the doctor was transferring him to a state mental
institution.

(Tr., p. 1379).

The plaintiff admitted on cross

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

...
examination that during the interview with Dr. Moench the

plain-

t if f made no mention or hint of any intention to jump out of
the window.

(Tr., pp. 1484-1485).

Dr. Moench testified that upon leaving the plaintiff's
room he immediately prepared a consultation report.
pp. 68-70; Tr., pp. 1245-1246).
duced in Appellant's brief,

(Ex. D-1,

Although previously repro-

(Appellant's Brief, pp. 20-21) the

importance of this report requires verbatim repetition.
report stated the following:
Pt. is a geologist from Moab who had a recent injury & operation for cerv. disc. Following, he has had marked & rapid swings in
mood, in contact with reality, has fluctuated between cooperation & compliance & combative, suspicious hostility.
At present he is very tense, says he hears
voices of 2 to 4 persons--in hall & ceiling,
talking about (not to) him, keeping him under
surveilance, (sic) accusing him of being a
sex fiend, etc. etc.
Tells of prolonged marital problems, of lack
of problem-solving skills (bilateral), of
periods of tension over finances, & esp. recently when his work pressures are high. Had
2 counselling (sic) sessions but felt that
he was cast as the villain, so he didn't continue.
Has enjoyed & appreciated his visits-Mr. Griffiths. Was esp. appreciative of a
visit off the ward, where the surveilance
(sic) doesn't follow.
Inp:

1. Long term marital maladjust.
2. Present episode is either a dissociative reaction or a paranoid schizophrenic
reaction.
His tension is very high; his
anxiety level very high; his distortion of
reality may lead to acts of poor judgment.
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The

Suggest:
1.
a phenothiazine med. in fairly
large doses promptly (I'll take the liberty
of ordering) .
2. Avoid barbiturates, if possible
3.
Repeated reassurance by direct
nurse contact (nurse entering room, standing
by bed, while talking)
4.
If aud. hallucinations don't subside promptly, may have to move to 3 North
for safety.
5. Continue marital counseling--Mr.
Griffiths.
Thanks.
LG '1oench
23 Aug. 74
20:00 hour
After preparing this report he discussed it with the charge
nurse and Mrs. Nola Hunt, the nursing supervisor.

He told them

that they should check upon the patient at regular intervals and
suggested at least once an hour.

He also suggested that they

go talk to the plaintiff, identify themselves, and ask how he
was and if he needed anything.

(Tr., pp. 1273-1274).

At that

time he also wrote an order for his prescription which stated
the following:

Mellaril, 100 mg. Stat, 50 mg. q.i.d. and p.r.n.

Dalmane 30 mg. h.s., p.r.n.

(Tr., p. 1253).

It was the respon-

sibility of the hospital to obtain the necessary drugs and to
administer them according to the order.

(Tr., p. 1253).

The doctor stated that he did not view the plaintiff's condition as a psychiatric emergency and thought that the procedure and medicine prescribed would adequately take care of any
problem that night.

(Tr., pp. 1267-1269).

He did not call back
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to the hospital that night since he presumed that if anything
occurred contrary to his orders he would be notified.

(Tr.,

pp. 1268-1269).

atte~-

Nor did he see any reason to call the

ing physician Dr. Schricker.

(Tr., p. 1255).

Karen Pool, the registered nurse on duty between 3:00 p.m.
and 11:00 p.m., testified that she was not aware of any hallucination problems until the night of August 23 when she was informed of this fact by Dr. Moench.

He told her that Plaintiff

was hallucinating with voices and made suggestions that the
ses watch him closely.

M~

He also suggested that the nurses not

give him barbiturates and ordered Mellaril as a prescription
drug.

(Tr., pp. 1675-1676).

Nurse Pool stated that she under-

stood Dr. Moench's comments as a nursing order.

(Tr., p. 1676).

She stated that she then read the report that Dr. Moench
made and conferred with her staff consisting of an LPN and a
nurse's aide.

She told both of the women the essence of the

consultation and both of them then read the report themselves.
It was decided that the plaintiff should be checked at least
every hour.

(Tr., p. 1678).

The nurses decided to keep his door open so they could look
in on him as they walked by his room.

Nurse Pool placed herself

in a position to check on him frequently.
was sent down to the pharmacy.

The medication order

(Tr., p. 1679).

The Mellaril was not given until 10:00 even though the or-

-16-
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der required that it be given immediately.

At 10:00 she entered

the room of plaintiff and gave him the Mellaril and asked him if
he wanted something for sleep.

He replied no.

At 11:00 she

again asked him if he wanted anything for sleep and he again
refused.

(Tr., p. 1680; 1702).

When the witness last saw the

plaintiff she stated he was calm and unexcited and there was no
evidence that he was suffering from hallucinations.

(Tr., p.

1710).
LaRona Callahan, the LPN on duty from 3:00 to 11:00 o'clock,
testified that after Dr. Moench left the hospital she had a conversation with Karen Pool and the nurse's aide concerning the
patient.

She stated she read the consultation report and checked

on the plaintiff at least every hour to make sure he was comfortable.

Around 8:00 she talked with him about going home and

about seeing his little girl.
seemed calm and rested.

(Tr., p. 1720).

At that time he

(Tr., p. 1721).

At 9:00 or 9:30 she went in and gave_ him a backrub which is
known as H.S. care.
time.

He also appeared calm and coherent at that

(Tr., p. 1722).
The next time she saw the plaintiff was around 10:30 or

11:00.

She recalled a conversation with the plaintiff as to

how beautiful the city was at night and how the lights shone.
She went off shift at 11:30 and noticed him resting and watching
TV at that time.

(Tr., p. 1723).

-17-
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Nurse Pool stated that upon the changing of the shift at
11:00 she gave the full report to her replacement Diana Karr~.
She told Diana the contents of the consultation and told her
to leave the door open and to make frequent visits.

(Tr., p.

1681) .
The testimony of Plaintiff during this period of time
in marked contrast with that of the nurses.

was

He stated that

after Dr. Moench left, his feelings of anxiety and fear

great~

increased.

int~

He believed he heard the doctor talking out

hallway about him and that he would be transferred to a state
mental institution.

Sometime before 9:00 he called his wife

and told her to call him by 9:30 the next morning because he
felt that something was going to happen to him.
1381).

(Tr., pp. 1379-

He thought that people were going to come in at night

and take him away.
He stated that during this period of time the audio hallucinations continued.

He would get into bed and would lie ther€

for a few minutes and then walk back and forth around the rooo.
He would then get up and pace again.

(Tr., p. 1381).

Farrow

stated that he was frightened of the nurses and therefore did

not confide in them.

(Tr., p. 1433).

He stated he had no re-

collection of any nurses coming into his room after the doctor
left nor could he recall taking any medication after 8: 00 ·

He

also could not remember a backrub given to him by Nurse Callahan
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as stated in her testimony.

(Tr., pp. 1433-1434).

The Fall and After
The plaintiff testified that he became more and more anxiety ridden and finally decided he had to get out of the room.
He attempted to go through his bathroom into an adjoining room.
However, when he approached the room he heard somebody coughing
and this frightened him so much that he went back to his own
room.

(Tr., p. 1382).

He stated that during this time he lost

track of where he was and part of the time thought he was back
in the one-story Moab Hospital.

(Tr., p. 1382).

He related that the decision to jump occurred only a few
moments before he did it.

He said that he had no previous in-

tention of jumping and so therefore could not have told anyone
of his desire to escape.

(Tr., pp. 1483-1485).

He at first

tried to unlock the window but could not do so because it was
bolted.

(Tr . , p • 14 8 5 ) •

Thinking that he was on the ground and that he could just

jump out of the window and run, he carefully broke the window
clean so there would be no jagged edges.

(Tr., p. 1383).

He

stated on cross-examination that he jumped through the window
feet-first as if running a hurdle.

(Tr., p. 1454).

He stated

that the process of picking up the chair, smashing the window,
smashing it again, and smashing it once again, throwing it out
the window, stepping back two paces, and hurdling through the
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window took approximately 15 seconds.

(Tr . , p. 14 6 3 ) .

plaintiff stated on cross examination that even though h

The

e

too~

elaborate pains not to get cut he jumped through the window .

lr1

spite of his neck injury because he was afraid that the voices
would come in when they heard the breaking glass.

(Tr., pp,

1486-1487).

As soon as he exited the window he stated he immediately
knew what was happening and said,

"Oh my God".

face-down and then rolled on his back.

He landed falfr

(Tr., p. 1383).

The testimony concerning what was said after the plaintiff
had landed on the roof differed greatly between Plaintiff's
version and that of Defendants.

Joseph Saxton, a security offi-

cer for the L.D.S. Hospital, testified that on the morning of
August 24 he received a message on his radio to go to the west
end of the hospital.

When he arrived the night supervisor

him to go up on the roof.

He climbed up the lattice and

his flashlight on an object.
fully conscious.

turn~
~s

He then saw the plaintiff who

He asked him what he was doing there and

plaintiff said he had jumped out of the window.

t~

The officer

asked him why he had jumped and the plaintiff said,
to kill myself".

~N

"I want~

He then asked how he got out of the sealed w~

dow and was told that Plaintiff had thrown a chair through and
broke the window.

(Tr., pp. 1779-1780).

The witness immediately called the operator and told her
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tc

notify the emergency room to send a doctor to the west end of
the hos pi ta 1 ·

(Tr., P. 178 0) .

After this call another guard

and the hospital emergency doctor arrived on the roof.
1786).

(Tr., p.

The witness then went to the second floor where he

opened a window so there would be better access to the roof.
In order to do this, however, it required him to use a screwdriver, a pair of pliers, a hammer, and a chisel since the window was bolted in the same manner as the window in the plaintiff's room.

(Tr., pp. 1786-1787).

Defendants called Dr. John Thompson, an intern on duty at
the L.D.S. Emergency Ward on the night of August 24.

He stated

that he was summoned around 2:00 that night by a security guard
who told him that an individual had jumped from a window and was
lying on the roof.

(Tr., pp. 1649-1650).

When he arrived there a second security guard was standing
over the individual with a flashlight.

The plaintiff was lying

on his back and was completely conscious.

He examined the

plaintiff and found his vital signs to be stable.

He did not,

however, find any affirmative response to a neurological examination.

(Tr., pp. 1651-1652).

He asked him if he had jumped from the window and the plain1r·

tiff responded affirmatively.

He then asked him if he was try-

ing to commit suicide and he again answered affirmatively.
:c

p. 1654).

-21-
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(Tr.,

Dr. Louis Schricker, the plaintiff's attending physician,
related how he was notified at 2:40 in the morning by the nursing supervisor that Plaintiff had jumped out of the hospital
window.

He stated that he immediately got dressed and drove

to the hospital where he was taken by an intern to a window
which gave him access to plaintiff.

(Tr., p. 1893).

At the

time he arrived the plaintiff was fully conscious, alert, and
fully oriented.

At that point, he said, "Chester, Chester, why

in the world did you do that?"

The plaintiff replied to the

effect that he could not face going back to Moab and the problems confronting him.

(Tr., p. 1900).

Shortly thereafter he entered a notation in the "progress
notes" which reads as follows:
August 24 - At time I arrived at 0325 patient was on the roof at second floor level
I went out to him
over the P.T. Entrance.
and found him covered with blankets, head
sandbagged, and lying as he had landed.
Depression in the roof. Patient alert and
conscious.
I asked him why he did such a
thing and he replied that life was not
worth fighting for, that he had wanted to
die for many months and this seemed like a
good time to do it.
(Ex. D-1, p. 89;
Tr., p. 1904).

The evidence presented was consistent in showing that Plaintiff was fully conscious and alert after his fall.

All wit-

nesses previously referred to noted this fact and Plaintiff never denied his mental sharpness.

The vital signs of Plaintiff

taken immediately after the incident shov.'ed he was calm, awake,
and lucid.

(Tr., pp. 1905-1908).
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The plaintiff remembered these conversations quite differently.

The plaintiff denied telling the guard, Mr. Saxton,

that he had tried to commit suicide.

He further denied telling

Dr. Thompson that he tried to commit suicide.

(Tr. , p. 19 3 6) .

As to the conversation with Dr. Schricker he specifically
denied telling him that life was not worth fighting for or that
he wanted to die for many months and that it seemed like a good
time to do it.

All he recalled was being asked why he had

jumped and replying, "I don't know".

(Tr., p. 1937, 1386).

A jury trial was commenced on August 30, 1977 before the
Honorable Stewart M. Hansen, Jr ..

In addition to those wit-

nesses previously referred to in this Statement of Facts, several other witnesses were called by both the plaintiff and the
defendant for the purpose of establishing liability and damages.
Plaintiff read into the record the deposition of Dr. Sidney
Walker, a California psychiatrist.

(Tr., pp. 1558-1559, 1566).

In addition, the testimony of Dr. Hardin Branch, the former head
of the University of Utah Department of Psychiatry, was read to
the jury.

(Tr., p. 1569).

At the request of Plaintiff's coun-

sel the testimony of both of these doctors and any objections

1-

made by opposing counsel were omitted from the record.
519; Tr., p. 1569).

(R., P·

The plaintiff also called Dr. Charles Rich

Smart, the chief of surgery of the L.D.S. Hospital, as a witness.
(Tr., pp. 1575-1584).

Other medical witnesses testified on
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Plaintiff's behalf but limited themselves solely to the question of damages.
Dr. Lincoln Clark and Dr. Eugene Bliss testified on behalf
of Defendants as to the issue of liability.

(Tr., pp. 1790-1855),

They testified that Dr. Moench had not violated any medical
dard in the treatment of Plaintiff.

sta~

Since most of the pertinent
t~

testimony of these medical witnesses will be discussed during
Argument portion of this brief, further comment is unnecessary
at this point.
After the court denied Defendant's Motions for Directed
Verdict (Tr., pp. 1649, 1946) the questions of liability and
damages were submitted to the jury.

The jury returned a verdict

in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, no cause
for action.

(R., p. 454).

Plaintiff has initiated this appeal as to Defendants Salt
Lake Clinic and Louis G. Moench based upon the jury verdict.

Tu

addition, Plaintiff has appealed froM the granting of summary
judgments in favor of Health Services Corporation and Louis J.
Schricker.

(R., pp.

508-509).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE
JURY AS TO THE DUTY OF DEFENDANT MOENCH
WHEN VIEWED IN LIGHT OF PLAINTIFF'S THEORY
OF THE CASE AND THE EVIDEiJCE.
Appellant in his brief claims that the trial court erred in
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giving Instruction No. 19 to the jury.

This instruction reads

as follows:
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff intentionally jumped
from the window in an attempt to conunit suicide, he is not entitled to recover from defendants, and you must find against him, and
for the defendants, no cause of action.
(R.,
p. 483).
This instruction was modified by the court from the original instruction submitted by Defendants which stated the following:
If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that when the plaintiff jumped from
the window he was attempting to conunit suicide, he is not entitled to recover damages
from the defendants.
(R., p. 443).
It should be noted that the modified instruction uses the
word "intentionally" whereas the proposed instruction omits this
word.

Obviously, the instruction read to the jury was intended

to preclude Plaintiff from recovery against the defendants if the
jury found that the plaintiff intentionally attempted to take his
own life.
Plaintiff in his brief now argues that this instruction was
erroneous.

The argument is made that, while Plaintiff may have

attempted to take his own life, he did so only because of a deranged mind and the act of suicide itself was the "poor judgment"
referred to in Dr. Moench's report.

Plaintiff then cites se-

veral authorities to the effect that a psychiatrist has the duty
to prevent suicide if it is reasonably foreseeable that it may
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occur.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 45-47).

A review of the record in this case clearly shows, however
I

that Plaintiff's argument is without merit in light of the evidence and the theories introduced by Plaintiff at trial.

The

controversy in this case, as shown by the record, evolved around
two opposing contentions of the parties:

Plaintiff claimed that

the voices and hallucinations forced him to try to escape out
the window which he believed at

~he

time to be only one story

high and this attempted escape was the type of "poor judgment"
Dr. Moench referred to in his consultation report; Defendants,
on the other hand, claimed that Plaintiff knowingly and intentionally at tempted to commit suicide because of his personal desires not to live.
There was no evidence at trial nor was there any theory
propounded that Plaintiff attempted to commit suicide because
he was not in full control of his senses.

Plaintiff consiste~~

maintained throughout the trial that he never tried to commit sui·
cide for any reason.

Likewise, the plaintiff never offered any

instructions to the court counteracting Defendant's theory that
suicide was intentional.

An examination of the record amply

supports these contentions.
Appellant himself quotes his testimony concerning his attempt to escape from the voices.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-12).
·

·

·

He states that he attempted to escape through an adJ01n1ng
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room

but was frightened by people talking and coughing.

He stated

that since he thought he was on the ground floor of the Moab
Hospital that he could easily escape by jumping through the window.

Finally, he testified that as soon as he began falling

from the window he

im.~ediately

knew what had happened, i.e., that

he was actually on the sixth floor of the L.D.S. Hospital.
This testimony was again repeated during cross examination
of the plaintiff.

The following dialogue between Mr. Hanson

(Defendant Salt Lake Clinic's attorney) and the plaintiff occurred:
Q

But before you went out of the window,
you have a clear recollection of the
events that you told us about, do you
not?

A

Yes, I was trying to get out of the
room.

Q

When you went out of the window?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

You said you ran and jumped out, is that
right?

A

Ran as much as you can and take two
steps.

Q

That's right. In other words, you were
moving a little faster than you ordinarily would have been?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

r think you also told us, as I recall
your testimony this morning, that you
put one foot on the window sill?
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A

I said I may have.
I did.

Q

Do you recall whether or not you did?

A

I'm not certain of it.

Q

Yes.
You were concerned, it didn't
occur to you at the time you were concerned about the voices or concerned
about your safety to go through the
window and climb down so you wouldn't
be hurt?

A

I didn't realize I was on the sixth
floor.
I thought that I was on the
first floor, that I would be able to
jump out and start running and get away
from the hospital. My sole purpose
was to get out of that room.

Q

When you thought you were on the first
floor, did you have any idea how far
it would have been from the first floor
down to the ground level?

A

Maybe four or five feet.

Q

You thought you were on the first floor
even though that day you had been down
from the sixth floor down to the patio
and down to the lower level with Mr.
Griffiths; is that right?

A

That is correct. But I have also told
you that I had been hallucinating; I
would have been hallucinating off and on
all day long.
It was a problem for me.
And my sole intention was to get out of
that room, and I thought at that time
that I was on the ground floor. Also, I
thought I was confused in this respect,
that part of the time I thought that I
was in the hospital at Moab and part of
the time I thought I was in the hospital
in Salt Lake City.
That's as best as I
can remember.
(Tr., pp. 1436-1437).

I didn't say that
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In sharp contrast to this testimony that the exit from
the window was caused by a desire to escape the voices is the
testimony of several witnesses who spoke with Plaintiff after
the fall.
Mr. Joseph Saxton was the security guard who first arrived
at the scene and found Plaintiff lying on his back on the roof.
Mr. Saxton stated the following in his examination by Mr. Snow:

Q

Did you observe whether or not this
man who was still on the roof was conscious or not?

A

He was conscious, yes sir.
talking.

Q

Did you have a conversation with him?

A

Being surprised, I looked down.
"What are you doing here?"

Q

Who was present when you said that to
him?

A

Myself and him.

Q

Was anyone else there on the roof at
that time?

A

No, no one else was on the roof at that
time.

Q

All right.
Tell the jury what you said
to him and what he said to you.

A

I said to him basically, as I recollect,
"What are you doing here?" He said, "I
jumped out of the window." I said, "Why
did you jump out of the window?" He said,
"I wanted to kill myself".
(Tr., pp.

He was

I said,

1779-1780).
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tiff had stated to him that he was trying to get away from
ces the witness replied, "No, sir, I do not recall that."

VOi-

!Ir.

Garrett then asked, "That could have formed part of that conversation, though, couldn't it?"
to my recollection, sir.

The witness then replied,

"~t

The recollection of the conversation

is just as I have explained previously."

(Tr., p. 1792).

Dr. John Thompson testified that he was on duty at the
gency ward the night of the incident.

e~~

He stated that he was su>

maned to the roof by a security guard and that upon arriving

~

stated:
I asked him if he jumped from the window and
he responded affirmatively. That was a vocal
response but at this time I do not remember
the exact words.
Q

Was there any further conversation?

A

Following that I asked him if he was
trying to commit suicide, and he again
answered affirmatively.
(Tr., p. 1654).

Finally, Dr. Louis Schricker, the plaintiff's attending phy·
sician, testified as to his conversation with the plaintiff upon
arriving approximately one hour after the fall.

The doctor

stated the following:
"Chester, Chester, why in the world did you
do that?" And he said that he couldn't face
going back to Moab, that the problems there-I can't recall the words exactly, but other
than the fact that he couldn't go back.
(Tr.,
p. 1900).
Immediately after examining the plaintiff, Dr. Schricker
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wrote a "Neurology Resident Note" which stated in pertinent part:
Patient alert and conscious.
I asked him why
he did such a thing and he replied that life
was not worth fighting for, he had wanted to
die for many months and this seemed like a
good time to do it.
(Tr., p. 1904).
In addition to these direct statements made by Plaintiff
at the time of his fall there was other evidence indicating emotional problems.

Plaintiff confirmed that he had divorced his

wife in 1966 but that they had gotten back together since that
time.

(Tr., p. 1422).

His marital difficulties were still con-

tinuing, however, as evidenced by the notations made by Mr.
Kent Griffiths, the psychiatric social worker.

Mr. Griffiths

made the following notation on August 20 concerning a consultation with Plaintiff:
Had long discussion with patient. Reveals extensive history of personal and marital difficulties.
He expressed the dynamics involved
in his wife's problems and his own. His confusion seems to revolve around the lack of
any consistent meaning to the significant relationships in his life. He loves his family
dearly but is unable to express those feelings
to them and is often supressed by his wife
when he tries to talk to her. This can be
seen as an extension of her own insecurity and
needs.
So both are struggling to have their
needs met and neither is listening to the
other.
(Tr., p. 1423).
A second entry dated August 22 also reveals family difficulties.
This stated:
Discussed problems with wife of patient.
There definitely are and have been for years
problems in this marriage that need psychiaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tric if not other forms of counseling.
There
seems to have been little give and take and
this has affected not only the marriage but
the children as well. Feelings of jealousy,
inadequacy, resentment, fear, withdrawal have
been expressed.
(Tr., p. 1424).
Dr. Schricker testified that he had a conversation with the
plaintiff prior to the incident.

He related this conversation

as follows:
Mr. Farrow was very concerned about his wife,
that he had had some marital and domestic
difficulties over a long period of time and
was concerned about her and concerned about
his children. And he had a young daughter
who at that time was seven years of age, a
pretty little blond gal, that he thought the
world of, but there was a lot of worry, concern. Apparently his business had not been
doing too well, he had financial worries, and
we talked about these from time to time.
(Tr.,
p. 1895).
As a result of this conversation Mr. Griffiths, the psychia
tric social worker, was consulted in order to try to help him
solve these problems.

(Tr., p. 1922).

Other things bothered

the doctor concerning the relationship between Mr. Farrow
wife.

He stated:
Yes, there were many things going on there
that were disturbing, that were obvious. One
of the things that disturbed me, and some of
the nurses, too, for instance, was that when
Mrs. Farrow would come, why, instead of feeding Mr. Farrow like most other relatives do,
why, she would come and have a guest tray,
but let the nurse feed him. We thought this
was a little strange. And one of the discussions that Mr. Farrow and I had centered
around this. A..nd it was obvious that there

-32-
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was a good deal of stress and strain here
that he loves his little daughter, I thin~,
probably more than anyone else in the world
and was always very happy and pleased when
she was there.
And it would be things of
this nature that we would discuss.
(Tr., p.
1925).
It was agreed by all medical witnesses, however, that
while Plaintiff was obviously bothered by these personal problems, he showed no outward signs of depression or other symptoms generally associated with suicide.

(Tr., pp. 1808; 1838;

1882; 1897).
On rebuttal the plaintiff adamantly denied any attempt of
suicide.

The following dialogue occurred between Plaintiff and

his counsel during rebuttal testimony:
Q

Now, in connection with the time that
you were talking there on that roof, do
you remember Dr. Thompson talking to you?

A

Vaguely.

Q

And you saw Dr. Thompson here testify?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

In this case. And do you recall what
your conversation was with him, if any?

A

There was very little conversation with
him.

Q

Do you remember what was said?

A

It was mostly just about how I felt, and
he really didn't say a whole lot of anything.

Q

And did he ever say to you, "Did you try
to commit suicide?" And you replied,
"Yes."'?
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A

Absolutely he did not.

Q

Now, do you remember Mr. Saxton who
testified here in this case?

A

The guard?

Q

Yes.

A

Yes, I do.

Q

And do you remember him on the roof
that night?

A

Yes, I do.

Q

Did you have a conversation with him?

A

Very brief.
He was busy trying to get
help.
He said practically nothing to
me.

Q

Did you ever say to him that you had
tried to commit suicide?

A

Certainly not.

O

And did you try to comrnit suicide?

A

No, sir.

Q

Now, there was a conversation that you
had with Dr. Schricker when he arrived;
do you remember that?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

On the roof?

A

Yes, sir.

Q

And I will ask you to state whether or
not this transpired in that conversation:
"I asked why he did such a thing--" that
is you "--and he--" that is you "--replied
that life was not worth fighting for, that
he had wanted to die for many months, and

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-34-

that this seemed like a good time to
do it." Did you ever say that?
A

No, sir.

Q

And do you recall that conversation
on the roof with Dr. Schricker?

A

Not what you just said, but I remember
our conversation with him.

Q

Could you tell us what you said and
what he said?

A

Well, he said he asked me first--and
he was standing up a few feet from me-and he asked, "Chester, why did you do
it?" And I said, "I don't know." And
after he came over and was leaning over
examining me, he said, "Why did you do
it?" I said, "I don't know." He asked
me again, "Why did you do it?" I said,
"I don't know." And that was about the
end of the conversation.
(Tr., pp.
1936-1937) (Emphasis added).

In closing argument, Plaintiff's counsel adamantly denied
any attempt of suicide regardless of what the motivating cause
may have been.

Mr. Garrett stated to the jury:

This was not an attempted suicide, ladies and
gentlemen. This man had nothing to be depressed about. His business was going good.
Sure, he had trouble with his wife. There is
no question about that. You don't kill yourself over that; you get a divorce. That's
the modern way. And that's all it was here.
He had a little daughter that he loved. And
he wouldn't want to take his life. You heard
that from Dr. Schricker. That little daughter
means everything to him. You don't kill yourself when you are raising babies. He was responding to those voices, trying to get away
from them, and that's all he was doing at the
time. And that's what Dr. Branch says.
(Tr.,
p. 1968).
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After Defendant's counsel made their closing st a t ement to
the jury observing that suicide was a very likely possibility
in light of the testimony and evidence introduced at the trial
Mr. Roberts, in rebuttal, then made the following statenent:
The testimony of Mr. Farrow, I think, rings
true.
He was having these auditory hallucinations.
He was scared.
He wanted to get
away from these voices. And that's why he
went out the window.
He had no reason. What
reason did he have to kill himself? lie was
having marital difficulties, yes.
Said he
was having no financial difficulties, he was
doing better than he had done for a year at
that time.
Why would he want to take his
life?
He had a daughter that he loved, people that
he wanted to live for, had been talking about
getting out on the next Tuesday.
He had
things to live for.
That isn't the frame
of mind of a person who is going to commit
suicide.
And then I think one thing of great significance is one of these notes on the progress
reports on August 30--this is after the event-and Mr. Griffiths, his friend who has been
talking to over this period of time, put the
note in the progress report, and he says this:
"Nice discussion with patient.
He was very
coherent and self-expressive. We discussed
the precipitance of his accident.
He felt
that the voices and noises were unbearable at
that moment and that they were even out in the
hall, so the window seemed the only escape
route.
And then the other thing that would indicate
that this is not a suicide:
Can you imagine
somebody who is going to commit suicide checking around and taking all of the glass off so
he won't get cut? Isn't that the action of a
man who wants to get out of there and get
away? He said, I hurdled that.
He said, I
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thought I was in Moab.
the first floor.

I thought I was on

So we submit that on this question of suicide that he did not intend to commit suicide.
Nobody in this record said that he indicated
he was going to do it. And he had been under
close observation. Dr. Moench didn't see it.
He just didn't commit suicide. He was trying
to escape from those voices that were giving
him the problem.
(Tr., pp. 2001-2002).
(Emphasis added) .
Thus, the preceding evidence shows quite clearly that the
plaintiff's version of the fall greatly differed from that of
Defendants', i.e. Plaintiff claiming escape and Defendants claiming suicide.

The record is void of any argument made by Plain-

tiff during the trial to the effect that while he was admittedly trying to commit suicide he was doing it because of his
mental condition at the time of the jump.

As has been seen,

Plaintiff adamantly denied attempting suicide for any reason
and steadfastly claimed that the "voices" forced him to flee the
window.
For Appellant to now claim that the jury instruction was
prejudicial because it denied him the opportunity to argue that
even an act of suicide may have been "poor judgment" is an afterthought which cannot be sustained by this 2ourt.
It was Appellant's obligation to propose instructions which
presented his theory of the facts.

For example, if Plaintiff

believed he had irrationally attempted suicide because of the

-37-
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negligence of Defendants in not restraining him, he should ha\'c
formulated an instruction to that effect and presented it to
the trial court for consideration.
tion was offered by Plaintiff.

In fact, no such instruc-

(R., pp. 455-461).

It was not the duty of Defendants to propose an instruction which would cover Plaintiff's theory of the incident.
This Court in Ferguson v. Jongsma, 350 P.2d 404

(Utah 1960)

clearly stated this rule in the reverse context of plaintiff
and defendant.

This Court stated:

Plaintiff in proposing an instruction on his
theory of the case is not required to also
propose instructions setting out all the possible defenses thereto.
If defendants desired
instructions on defenses to any ground which
would allow plaintiff to recover they should
propose them.
Id. at 410.
Furthermore, even had such an instruction been proposed,
the evidence simply did not support such a theory.

There was

no testimony that Plaintiff attempted suicide because of
ces or because of an irrational mind.

the~'

He consistently denied

any suicide from any cause.
This Court in Black v. McKnight, 562 P. 2d 621

(Utah 197il

stated that the trial court may properly refuse to give a requested instruction where it does not accurately reflect the la'•
governing the factual situation of the case.
Similarly, in an earlier case, this Court in Griffin v.
1
Prudential Insurance Company of America, 133 P · 2d 333 (U tah 19~
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stated that it was error to give instructions on a state of
facts where there is no evidence even should such instruction
contain correct statements of law.
ma, 350 P.2d

See also Ferguson v. Jongs-

(Utah 1960).

Defendants do not dispute the rules of law cited by Appellant in his brief concerning the duty of a psychiatrist to
prevent a patient from harming himself if such harm is foreseeable.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 46-47).

However, there is

no evidence that Plaintiff gave any sign that he was contemplating suicide nor is there any evidence by Plaintiff's own testimony that he attempted suicide.

The question of suicide, there-

fore, was totally a defense to Plaintiff's claims that he was
driven out of the window by the voices and that Defendants negligently allowed this attempted escape to occur.
Instruction No. 20 concerning proximate cause is a correct
statement of the requirement of duty, proximate cause, and damages and does not in any way distort the previous jury instruction.

Plaintiff's claimed error with this instruction (Appel-

lant's brief, p. 48) requires an extremely strained speculation
of the jurors' thinking and is totally unrealistic in view of
the correctness of the instruction standing by itself.
In addition to the preceding reasons for rejecting Appellant's claimed error, there exists one further ground against
Appellant, i.e., the objections to Instructions 19 and 20 were
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not made timely.

The parties stipulated that objections to

the jury instructions could be made after the jury retired.
(Tr., p. 1948).

The jury began its deliberations at 1:00 p.rn.

and Defendants presented their objections to the instructions
at that time.

(Tr., pp. 2010-2023).

returned with its verdict.

At 3:30 p.rn. the jury

(Tr., p. 2024).

Plaintiff's ex-

ceptions were given after the rendering of the verdict and
after the jury's discharge.

(Tr., pp. 2025-2027).

This Court has repeatedly held that Rule 51, U.R.C.P.
requires timely objections be made to jury instructions in order to allow the trial court an opportunity to cure any error.
Johnson v. Simons, 551 P.2d 515

(Utah 1976); Black v. McKnight,

562 P.2d 621 (Utah 1977); Hanson v. General Builders Supply Co.,
389 P.2d 61 (Utah 1964).

Certainly, objections made after the

jury has been discharged cannot be considered timely.
For these reasons, the trial court was correct in submitting Instructions 19 and 20 to the jury.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR AS TO
THE TESTIMONY OF DP.. SIDNEY WALKER OR AS
TO THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 11.
A.

Dr. Walker's Testimony.

1.
The Plaintiff has Waived Any ClaiQed Error Regarding Dr. Walker's Testimony by Omitting it From the Transcript Record.
Appellant in his brief recites that Dr. Sidney Walker, a

-40-
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specialist in neuro-psychiatry, examined Plaintiff's records
and reviewed various depositions before testifying at his own
deposition taken on July 27, 1976.

Plaintiff then asserts that

even though Dr. Walker in his deposition testified that the
various defendants failed to properly care for the plaintiff,
the trial judge incorrectly refused to allow this opinion to be
admitted into evidence.

The reason for this omission, accord-

ing to the plaintiff, is that the doctor had never practiced
medicine in Utah and therefore was incompetent to testify as to
the medical standard of care in this state.

(Appellant's brief,

pp. 49-50).
There is nothing in the transcript of the trial evidencing
Plaintiff's contentions and, the fact is, many portions of Dr.
Walker's deposition were read to the jury and were not omitted
by the trial court.
The transcript offers no assistance to this Court as to
what specific portions of Dr. Walker's testimony was omitted by
the trial court.

The transcript states on page 1558, "The tes-

timony of Dr. Sidney Walker was read into the record.

During a

reading of the deposition counsel argued their respective positions".

A reference is then nade on page 1559 that an objection

to the deposition starting on page 26 was overruled by the trial
court.

It is then noted that the deposition was continued to be

read until 2:00 that afternoon.

(Tr., p. 1559).

Finally, the
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record notes that counsel concluded the reading of Dr. Walker',
deposition.

(Tr. , p. 15 5 6) .

The "Designation of Record on Appeal" filed by Plaintiff
specifically excluded the testimony of Dr. Walker.
519).

(R.' p.

All depositions in the court file were designated and

this request necessarily included the deposition of Dr.
( R. , pp.

6 77 - 814 ) .

Walk~.

However, how this deposition was used at

trial and the specific objections made by Defendants' counsel
is absent from the record.
The failure of Plaintiff to include the actual reading of
the deposition and the rulings of the trial court precludes
Plaintiff from now claiming error as to alleged omissions of
testimony.

Several courts in other jurisdictions have dealt

with similar problems.
In Grover v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Compan;,
207 S.E.2d 584

(Ct. App. Ga. 1974) the following statement

made:
Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred in
excluding from the evidence portions of Dr.
Lawrence Lee Freeman's depositional testimony. A reading of the trial transcript
beginning at page 117 indicates that the deposition was not introduced as such but was
read before the jury. At those portions
which Appellant contends were erroneously
excluded the transcript shows that objections were made by defense counsel.
Instead
of reading those portions into the trial record and obtaining a ruling by the judge
thereon, the portions were omitted. Thus
we are unable to pass upon the assertion.
Our "decision must be made on the record
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~s

sent to this court by the clerk of the court
below and not upon the briefs of counsel".
Jenkins v. Board of Zoning, Etc., 122 Ga.
App. 412, 413, 177 S.E.2d 204, 206.
Id. at
586.
Similarly, the Missouri Court of Appeals in Williamson v.
Epperson, 529 S.W.2d 25 (Ct. App. Mo. 1975) made the following
pertinent observations:
Further and more important, the plaintiffs
have come to this court on a record wholly
insufficient for us to adjudicate the merits
of their claim.
They argue specifically
they were denied the opportunity to read
certain questions and answers from a deposition, but the deposition is not preserved
in the record, except for those parts which
were actually offered and received. Since
the deposition was not copied into the record,
then made a part of the record here in any
manner, we cannot pass on the admissibility
of the parts of the deposition plaintiffs
sought to offer.
Id. at 29.
(Emphasis added).
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Sun Cab Company v.
Walston, 289 A.2d 804

(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972) stated the fol-

lowing:
Appellants proffered to read into evidence
some 13 lines from a pre-trial deposition
of Richard B. Walston. The court, "after
hearing discussion from counsel and reading
the case offered" denied that request. The
record does not contain the discussion, nor
the deposition. We have no way of knowing
what was proffered, nor the reasons advanced
for and against its admission. There is
nothing we can rule upon.
Id. at 822.
(Emphasis added).

~also Paulin v. Paulin, 102 P.2d 809 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1940);

-43-
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Friesen v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, 524
1141

p

.

• 2d

(Kan. 1974).
The obvious principle behind these decisions is that a

re·

viewing court cannot tell whether prejudice has occurred by th!
omission of testimony unless the specific testimony omitted ~
the objections made are before the reviewing court.

In this

case the entire deposition of Dr. Walker was before the court
and only portions of the testimony were objected to by Defendants.

It is impossible to tell from the present record what

that testimony was and whether it constituted an "opinion" of
Dr. Walker or consisted of other material.

In addition, it is

impossible to know what the grounds for the exclusion was and
if, indeed, all exclusions related solely to the medical standard of care in Utah.
For this reason alone, Plaintiff's contention that the
court erred in omitting portions of Dr. Walker's testimony
not be substantiated by this Court and must therefore be

ca~

rej~·

ted.
2.
In Any Event, the Testimony of Dr. Walker Was
Cumulative and Inferior to That of Plaintiff's Other Expert,
Branch and Any Omission Was Therefore Harmless.

Dr

It is important to note that this is not a case where
Plaintiff was denied expert witness testimony for failure to
meet a standard.

First, as previously noted, a large portion

of Dr. Walker's testimony was read to the jury.

Second, and mer
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importantly, the testimony of Dr. Hardin Branch was read to the
jury jn its entirety with no omissions or deletions.
1569).

(Tr., p.

The testimony of Dr. Branch in and of itself was suffi-

cient to establish Plaintiff's theory of a standard and created
a jury question.
The deposition of Dr. Branch was taken on two separate occasions:

first on August 4, 1977 (R., pp. 853-927); and again

on September 3, 1977

(R., pp. 1095-1155).

There is no doubt that Dr. Branch was eminently qualified
to testify both in his expertise as a psychiatrist and as to
his experience in Utah.

He obtained his M.D. degree in 1935

and subsequently worked in Pennsylvania.

From 1948 until 1970

he was Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at the University
of Utah Medical Center.

(R., pp. 861-862).

miliar with Utah health care facilities

The doctor was fa-

(R., pp. 863-864), super-

vised residents who trained in the various hospitals including
the L.D.S. Hospital

(R., p. 916), and attended various conven-

tions and conferences in Utah since 1970.

(R., p.

917).

Dr.

Branch was the supervisor at various times of Dr. Eugene Bliss
and Dr. Lincoln Clark who testified on behalf of the Defendants.
In fact, Dr. Moench himself was also a member of the department
which Dr. Branch headed.

(R., p.

889).

Defendants' expert witness, Dr. Lincoln Clark, stated that
Dr. Branch had hired him at the time he joined the University of
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Utah faculty and that he considered Dr. Branch to be a nationally-recognized competent psychiatrist.
1816).

(Tr·, pp. 1815-

Dr. Eugene Bliss, Defendants' second expert witness,

also acknowledged Dr. Branch as a very competent psychiatrist
who had international recognition.

(Tr., p. 1844).

In fact, the only question as to the competency of any
expert witness was made by Dr. Branch concerning the qualifications of Dr. Walker--Plaintiff's expert witness whose testi·
mony is claimed to have been so critical.

Dr. Branch stated
a~

that there is no such thing as a "neuro-psychiatrist" since
tors are either certified in psychiatry or in neurology.

(R.,

pp. 8 81- 8 8 2) •
Dr. Branch was qualified as an expert witness under

eit~

the "local community" standard or any other standard and the
trial court allowed his testimony to be read to the jury.

Wit'..·

out elaborating as to the essence of Dr. Branch's testimony it
suffices to say that it was sufficient to challenge the actiom
of Defendants as to the proper psychiatric standard.

Dr. Bnoc

testimony is well summarized in the argument of counsel during
Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict.

(Tr., pp. 1624-1643;

see e.g. Tr., pp. 1624-1626; 1641-1643).
The reliance upon Dr. Branch as establishing a standard i:
further shown in the closing argument to the jury by Mr. Garrett:
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Now, let me try and put a little more on
that.
First of all, Dr. Rranch testified
in this case for the plaintiff, and he testified concerning the standard of care--in
other words, what must you do if you are to
avoid being at fault with a patient? That
is what, in effect, he is saying. And he
had an opinion to render, and I bring it to
you for your assistance at arriving at a
verdict in this case.
This was a question by Mr. Roberts: And
doctor do you have an opinion as to whether
or not Dr. Moench used the care and diligence
ordinarily exercised by psychiatrists in the
vicinity of Salt Lake City in caring for this
patient to whom he had been called in for a
psychiatric consultation? Do you have such
an opinion?
Answer:
Question:

Yes, sir, I do.
And what is that opinion?

Answer:
I think that ordinary care would
have required the placing of this patient
in a more protected situation either in his
own room or in a psychiatric unit.

* * *
There are other things in his testimony, as
you will recall. He amplified on that. He
said he didn't sufficiently impress the nurses with the urgency of the situation.
(Tr.,
pp. 1956-1957).
(Emphasis added).
Thus, the testimony of Dr. Branch sufficiently presented
Plaintiff's theory of the standard which Defendants allegedly
failed to maintain.

Dr. Branch was eminently more qualified

to testify than was Dr. Walker.

It is therefore difficult to

believe that Dr. Walker's testimony would have had any effect
upon the 1ury's consideration.
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As stated by the Supreme Court of Kansas, "Error may not
be predicated upon the exclusion of evidence which is merely
cumulative and does not add materially to the weight or c 1arit
of that already received."

Friesen v. Chicago, Rock

Pacific Railroad, 524 P.2d 1141, 1149 (Kan. 1974).

Island~

See also
---

Watkins v. Utah Poultry and Farmer's Cooperative, 251 P.2d 6E;
(Utah 1952).
In summary, the Plaintiff has waived any claim of error
committed as to the exclusion of Dr. Walker's testimony.

But

even if such an error were not waived, Plaintiff has made no
showing that the alleged omitted testimony would have had any
substantial effect upon the outcome of this case in light of

the testimony of Dr. Branch--a man acknowledged by Defendants'
own medical witnesses to be an internationally recognized

ex~

in psychiatry.
B.

Instruction No. 11.

1.
Plaintiff Himself Proffered Two Instructions
taining the "Local Community" Standard and Cannot Now Claim
Error.
Appellant complains that the eleventh instruction the
court read to the jury, speaking in terms of "accepted standards of psychiatric care in this community", was erroneous
because it applied the "locality rule".
50).

(Appellant's brief,

Appellant then proceeds to attack the existence of the

locality rule and argues that a more liberal standard should

-48-
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be adopted.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 51-58).

Of course, this

court has in fact adopted the more liberal "similar community"
standard argued by Appellant in its recent decision of Swan v.
~·

Case No. 14823.

Admittedly, Instruction No. 11 utilized

the existing standard of the "local community".

(R., p. 475).

Unlike the plaintiff in the Swan case, however, Appellant
proffered instructions to the court containing the local standard.

One proposed instruction of Plaintiff stated:
You are instructed that if you find from a
preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant Louis G. Moench, in treating Plaintiff,
failed to exercise the care and diligence
ordinarily exercised by a psychiatrist in
Salt Lake City, Utah, then you are instructed
that the said Louis G. Moench was negligent.
(R., p. 457).
(Emphasis added).

Plaintiff's second instruction stated:
And if you find further from a preponderance
of the evidence that such conduct in one or
more of the foregoing ways constituted a failure on the part of the said defendant to
exercise the care and diligence ordinarily
exercised by psychiatrists in Salt Lake City,
Utah, then you are instructed that said Louis
G. Moench was negligent.
(R., p. 458).
(Emphasis added).
Both of these instructions were given by the trial court as
Nos. 12 and 13.

(R., pp. 476-477).

Thus, it is difficult to imagine how Plaintiff can complain
about the giving of Instruction No. 11 when it is basically no
different than Instructions Nos. 12 and 13 which were proposed
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by Plaintiff and adopted by the trial court.

Plaintiff has

thus waived any claim of an erroneous standard being given by
the fact that he compounded the error.
2.
The Similar Community Standard Was In Fact Given
by the Trial Court in Instruction No. 10.
Defendant Moench proffered an Instruction No. 5 which ineluded the similar community standard.

(R., p. 405).

Plaintiff

proffered a similar instruction including this standard.

(R,,

p. 456).

The court combined both of these proffered instructions
and gave them as Instruction No. 10.

It stated the following:

In performing professional services for a
patient, a physician or surgeon has the duty
to have that degree of learning and skill
ordinarily possessed by physicians and surgeons of good standing, practicing in the same
or a similar locality and under similar circumstances.
It is his further duty to use the care and
skill ordinarily exercised in like cases by
reputable members of his profession practicing in the same or a similar locality under
similar circumstances, anu to use reasonable
diligence and his best judgment in the exercise of his skill and the application of his
learning, in an effort to accomplish the purpose for which he is employed.
In determining whether Dr. Moench properly
fulfilled the duties imposed upon him as a
psychiatrist, you are not permitted to set up
a standard of your own, but must look to the
testimony and evidence presented by physicians
at the trial as to what the standard of care
was at the time in question.
(R., p. 474) ·
(Emphasis added).
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Thus, Instruction No. 10 was extremely specific as to the
standard of care and actually utilized the "similar community"
standard even though it was not required by Utah law at that
time.

For purposes of determining propriety of jury instruc-

tions the instructions should all be considered together.
v. Christensen, 550 P.2d 1289,

Whyte

(Utah 1976).

The Tenth jury instruction specifically spoke in terms of
the medical standard to be applied and utilized the "similar
community standard".

The Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth in-

structions only incidentally ref erred to a standard and any
erroneous standard was included in two instructions offered by
Plaintiff himself.
For this reason, any misstatement of the standard in the
Eleventh, Twelfth, and Thirteenth instructions was harmless even
if it were assumed that the similar community standard was applicable prior to the Swan decision.
Finally, as discussed supra Plaintiff failed to make a
timely objection as to Instruction No. 11 and has therefore
waived any claimed error.

Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621 (Utah

1977).

C.
The Local Community Standard was a Correct Statement
of the Law in Utah at the Time of the Incident and at the Time
of Trial and any Change in such Standard Should Not be Applied
Retroactively to Incidents or Trials Predating the Swan Decision.
It is manifestly unjust to apply the new "similar locality
standard" to the defendants in this case and to any other parSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ties retroactively because this Court's decision in Swan has
changed a standard of care upon which these defendants, defendan ts in other pending lawsuits, and doctors not yet sued, have
been entitled to rely upon.
Justice Hall and Justice Henriod in the Swan decision dissented on the grounds that the decision should be applied prospectively only.

This position is correct in light of the se-

vere prejudice a retroactive change in a standard can create.
Dr. Moench and the other defendants in this case acted in
accordance with the local community standard in the treatment
of Plaintiff.

It is manifestly unjust to now, two years later,

require different standards of care than that which all parties
relied upon at the time of the incident and the time of the
trial.
This Court on numerous occasions has refused to apply a
change in statutory or common law retroactively when substantial
rights were being affected.

Rubalcava v. Gissman, 384 P.2d 389

(Utah 1963); Williams v. Utah State Department of Finance, 464
P.2d 596

(Utah 1970); Brunyer v. Salt Lake County, 551 P.2d 521

(Utah 1976); and Stanton v. Stanton, 564 P.2d 303

(Utah 1977).

This Court's decision of State v. Kelbach, 565 P.2d 700
(1977) stated in great detail the purpose of applying overrul~
decisions prospectively:
As a general proposition the law as established
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ture, whose prerogative it is to make and
change the law.
This does not mean to say
that where there is judge-made law which is
later observed to be clearly in error, that
such error should be so set in cement that
it cannot be remedied.
In such circumstances
the court undoubtedly can and should correct
it.
But more important than any of the above is
the oft proclaimed salutary principle:
That
ours is a government of laws and not of men.
Accordingly, the law should not be changed
simply because of the will or desire or judges as to what the law is or ought to be.
Much less so, should it be so changed during
the course of a particular proceeding to have
a retroactive effect thereon. Notwithstanding the fact that the change the state advocates would vindicate the position taken in
the dissent referred to, to so hold in this
case retroactively would violate what we regard as a higher principle:
that of honoring
the established law.
If there is to be such
a change in the law, whether by legislative
act or by judicial decision, it seems that it
should have only prospective effect and that
fairness and good conscience requires that it
should not be applied retroactively to adversely affect rights as they existed at the
time the particular controversy arose.
Id.
at 702.
(Emphasis added).
This long line of cases clearly shows this Court's concern
that the law be a reliable monument upon which a party can rely-not a shifting mound of sand.

The change to the "similar lo-

cality rule" is a drastic one that overrules a standard which
has existed for over 100 years.

It is unjust to apply this new

standard with all of its consequences and ramifications to these
defendants and to other physicians who in good faith attempted
to meet the local community standard existing at the time the
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alleged malpractice occurred.
Such unfairness affects the defendants in the instant
all the physicians presently in litigation , and all f u t ure

ph~,_

sicians or professionals whose actions occurred prior to the
Court's decision in Swan.
For these reasons, even if it is assumed for the sake of
argument that Dr. Walker's testimony was wrongfully excluded
or that Instruction No. 11 was wrongfully given, this Court
should hold that the similar community standard is not applica·
ble to cases predating the Swan decision.
POINT III
DR. MOENCH AND THE
BEEN VINDICATED BY
DECISION AS TO THE
NOW HAVE NO EFFECT

SALT LAKE CLINIC HAVE
A JURY AND THIS COURT'S
OTHER DEFENDANTS SHOULD
UPON THEM.

Appellant argues in his brief that all of the defendants
should be tried jointly in order to avoid prejudice to the
tiff since a litigating defendant has the opportunity of
ing the finger" to a missing defendant.

Pl~

"poi~

While this may or may

not be true, there is no rule of law which requires all def endants to be tried concurrently and in fact Rule 20(b) and Ru~
42 (b) specifically allow a trial court discretion in separatinc
the trial of parties or issues.
Dr. Moench and the Salt Lake Clinic have undergone an exhaustive trial and have been vindicated by a jury.

The fact

that Dr. Schricker and the L.D.S. Hospital did not participate
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in this trial is irrelevant to these defendants.

If this Court

determines that the sununary judgment as to those defendants was
improperly granted then a new trial should be ordered as to
those defendants but Dr. Moench and the Salt Lake Clinic are
certainly not required to undergo a second trial for the advantage of the plaintiff and his claim of prejudice by their absence.
If, indeed, the jury concluded that the hospital was the
negligent party in failing to correctly administer the orders
of Dr. Moench,

then it is probable that a new jury would reach

this same conclusion when the hospital itself was being tried.
Notwithstanding Plaintiff's argument, even if the hospital
points the accusing finger to Dr. Moench, it must be presumed
that the new jury will determine which party, if anY, was negligent in the treatment of Plaintiff and bring back a verdict
against that defendant if he or it is a party to the trial.
Even the plaintiff himself in his brief indicates that had
the medication ordered by Dr. Moench been given at the correct
time and in the correct dosage, "this tragedy could have been
prevented".

(Appellant's brief, pp. 27, 33).

And Plaintiff also

notes that had Dr. Schricker responded promptly "as he should
have, this tragedy would have been avoided".

(Appellant's brief,

p. 37).

Obviously, if both Dr. Schricker and the L.D.S. Hospital
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caused the injury to Plaintiff, the correct verdict was rendo

~r:

favorably for both Dr. Moench and the Salt Lake Clinic ancl t'

fie

should not be subjected to a second trial regardless of the o":
come concerning the other defendants.
CONCLUSION
A brief review of the Statement of Facts reveals that at
the time Plaintiff was admitted to the L.D.S. Hospital he was
encountering severe personal problems.

Dr. Moench quickly

a~

professionally responded to Dr. Sehr icker' s request for ass istance and professionally evaluated and prescribed treatment fm
Plaintiff.

The evidence is clear that Plaintiff exhibited no

signs of self-destruction.

There was no way, therefore, that

Dr. Moench could have predicted the action which Plaintiff took
on the night of August 24.
Plaintiff claimed that he heard voices which compelled hfo
to escape from his room.

Defendants claimed, on the other

that for personal reasons--and perhaps based upon reckless
pulse alone--Plaintiff attempted to kill himself.

ha~,

i~-

These were

the only two theories propounded at trial and argued by the re·
spective parties.
Instruction 19 concerning suicide was properly given by
the trial court in that it presented Defendants' theory of the
incident.

Had Plaintiff wanted to contend that he was actual~

attempting to commit suicide but that his action was cornrclled
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by his delusions and hallucinations, he should have introduced

evidence in support of this theory and tendered an instruction.
In reality, however, there was neither evidence of this
theory now argued in Appellant's brief nor was an instruction
offered presenting it.

In addition, Plaintiff did not make

timely objection to the instructions and has therefore waived
any claimed error.

For these reasons, the trial court was cor-

rect in giving Instruction No. 19 and No. 20 to the jury.
The plaintiff fails to present an adequate record to this
Court for review of Dr. Walker's testimony.
stituted a waiver of any such claim.

This failure con-

In addition, any testi-

mony offered by Dr. Walker was cumulative to the superior testimony of Dr. Branch who was eminently more qualified as an expert in psychiatry and whose opinion as to Defendants' breach
of standard was received into evidence.
Instruction Eleven was not prejudicial because Instruction
Ten actually presented the "similar community" standard and in
light of the fact that Plaintiff himself offered two instructions
adopting the local community standard about which he now complains.
The decision by this Court in Swan should only be applied
prospectively from the date of the decision so that doctors and
other professional people are not held accountable to a standard
Wltich did not exist at the time the alleged malpractice occurred.
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Finally, the outcome as to the other defendants in this
appeal is irrelevant to these defendants since they have already been tried and vindicated by a jury.
For all of these reasons, therefore, the jury verdict shoui
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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7th Floor, Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent Salt
Lake Clinic
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/
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,Oohn H. Snow
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
7th ~loor, Continental Bank
Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent Dr.
Louis G. Moench
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